One of the central concepts in Finance Theory is "the efficient markets hypothesis" which says, in a nutshell, that if there is money to be made doing something, resources will flock to that something with the result that pretty much all investment opportunities will yield the same rate of return after an adjustment for risk. Further wrinkles of the hypothesis show that the risk adjustment is linear: i.e. as the risk (measured as variability) of an asset changes, market forces will adjust asset prices so that the expected return adjusts by some constant amount.
Put differently (from Wikipedia):
In finance, the efficient-market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are "informationally efficient", or that prices on traded assets, e.g., stocks, bonds, or property, already reflect all known information. The efficient-market hypothesis states that it is impossible to consistently outperform the market by using any information that the market already knows, except through luck. Information or news in the EMH is defined as anything that may affect prices that is unknowable in the present and thus appears randomly in the future.
I have taught courses in corporate finance twice in my life, both while visiting The University of Guelph: once in 1984 and again last fall (2007). Given my general feelings of bare adequacy in the area, I am delighted and relieved that I am not teaching the course now. It would be very difficult to cover this material with a straight face.
If the efficient markets hypothesis holds, and if investors are generally rational maximizers with rational expectations, then how did the current financial situation evolve? Why was there so much systematic error or bias for so long in investors' assessments of assets? Why were there not more smart people betting against the trend and the euphoria of the markets?And why didn't these contrary bets play the auto-correction role normally expected in financial markets?
Nearly four years ago, Barry Ritholtz tried to answer these questions on his blog as he criticized EMH. At that time I was unconvinced by his arguments, and to be honest, I still am somewhat skeptical the explanations offered in "behavioural finance"; I find it really hard to understand why so many investors might leave so much money lying on the table for any length of time without realizing it is there. To personalize it, why didn't more people, like me or like JD, move a sizable bunch of their retirement assets out of equities and into less risky assets?
It is really hard to preach and teach EMH and rational expectations when so few people bet so little against the market, especially after the Northern Rock debacle over a year before the market meltdown.Why did it take so long for stock indices to drop and for the housing derivatives market to be exposed as the modern-day equivalent of the emperor's new clothes? Posner and Becker attempt to answer these questions, but even they are not sure (still, their thoughts on this topic are still worth reading).
Even if prior to the summer of 2007, people did not see the housing crisis coming and did not raise their eyebrows about all the NINJA mortgages, the weird derivatives, and the alleged insurance schemes backing them, why didn't the Northern Rock episode set off more alarm bells?
Is there a chance that the episode did, indeed, ring alarms loudly but that decision makers continued to gamble, hoping to get out of the market before the others did? After all, stock market indices continued to rise until October, 2007, indicating that most people seemed unconcerned about the possibility of imminent collapse of the house of cards.
Or is it possible that people saw the meltdown coming but expected that, as has happened, the gubmnt would bail out the major mortgage and derivative insurers (and many but not all of the holders of this wacko paper)? Perhaps the EMH is still a pretty decent theory unless the gubmnt is involved in some major fashion.
At any rate, I sure am glad I'm not teaching a finance course this term. It would be a case of the blind leading the blind.
Note: I pretty much learned finance by teaching the course back in 1984. I had done some research before then that relied on many principles in finance theory, but I had never had a formal course in financial theory. But that's no big deal. I have never had a course in The Economics of Sports or in Economic Analysis of Law, either, and those are the main courses I have been teaching over the past decade or so. One nice thing about a lengthy academic career is the flexibility to change fields as one's interests change.