Earlier this month, I wrote a post predicting that we will experience inflation in the 2-3 year long-term. This prediction was based solely on the expectation that central banks will be forced to monetize the massive deficits being created by gubmnts at all levels. Furthermore, even if these are short-term huge increases in deficits, they won't just go away. They are enormous additions to gubmnt debts and will have to be dealt with somehow even if gubmnt deficits return to pre-pandemic levels in the next year or so.
The trouble is, if I'm right and if others agree with me, then long-term interest rates should be higher than they are, and TIPS (inflation-protected bonds) rates should reflect higher inflation expectations. Given that neither the long-term bond rates nor the TIPS yields reflect an expectation of strong inflation, clearly others don't agree with me.
So was I wrong? Am I wrong to hold onto these beliefs?
As a part of a webinar* that I attended yesterday, presented by Dennis Lockhart and David Altig, both affiliated with the Atlanta FED, the question of long-term inflation was addressed.
- The FED balance sheets have been growing rapidly and will likely continue to do so, at least in the short run
- Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply curves are both shifting to the left, and without much implication about what will happen to overall price levels. When both curves shift to the left, we know output will fall, as it has, but we can't predict much about the overall price level without knowing more about the relative shifts.
- There will be some (or considerable, they weren't sure) structural shifting in the makeup of AD .
- Most of the growth in the FED balance sheet has been in very short-term paper. The FED has mostly been buying up short-term debt, Treasury Bills, and lending money very short-term through re-purchase agreements with major banks. Unlike the financial crisis of 2008, the commercial banking system seems pretty solid and solvent, but providing sufficient liquidity has been the aim of the FED.
- As countries emerge from the pandemic, the FED will gradually scale back its creation of reserves, and the balance sheets will shrink slowly, roughly in sync with the emergence from the pandemic.
- The gubmnt debt is growing rapidly. The FED can't let all the short-term paper expire; they'll have to monetize the debt. This is a potentially serious problem. All that increased debt created by governments at all levels simply won't go away. And as the FED monetizes that debt, there will be inflationary pressures. One possible out might be to increase the interest rate the FED pays on reserves, but neither of them mentioned that possibility.
- (and this one really bothered me) They argued that the Fed massively increased the balance sheet in dealing with the 2008 banking crisis and we didn't have inflation. My reaction would have been (if it had been a Zoom) don't be myopic:
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- That was when the Fed started paying interest on reserves. The Fed created reserves and the commercial banks saved them. The extra reserves didn't lead to much of an increase in the money supply as a result.
- They both seemed to think we'll emerge from this depression as quickly as possible as soon as we know we have a vaccine and/or treatments. If so, can the FED shed all those short-term securities just as quickly?
- How quickly we can emerge from it will depend on how serious the structural re-alignment will be and has been.
Put differently (or the same way I started), I don't think gubmnts are going to reduce their deficits or debts by cutting spending or increasing taxes much; Central Banks are going to monetize these increases in debt for the most part:
How can Central Banks monetize such extreme increases in gubmnt debt without creating inflationary pressures eventually?
And if I'm right, why aren't markets reflecting higher inflationary expectations?
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*I'm grateful to the Global Interdependence Center for inviting me to participate in their sponsored webinar, "College of Central Bankers presentation: Assessing the Monetary Policy Response"